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COMMENTS
MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC. v. UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE: EXTENDING THE
FOIA'S FIFTH EXEMPTION
Enacted by Congress in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act 1 is
intended to foster both an informed electorate and agency responsi-
bility by increasing public access to governmental records.2 Upon re-
quest by "any person," 3 governmental agencies must release identi-
fiable materials in their possession, unless the records specifically are
exempted from the act.4 If the agency withholds desired information,
the requesting party may seek an injunction in federal district court
compelling disclosure, and the court determines the question of dis-
1. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1977).
2. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1) (1970). Under § 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, the precursor to the FOIA, access to specific agency records was available
only to "persons properly and directly concerned" with the subject matter of the
requested documents. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). For a discussion of the
wide abuses accompanying this limited disclosure see S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1965).
4. The disclosure requirements of the FOIA are inapplicable to matters that
are:
1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interests of national defense or foreign policy;
2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential;
5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency;
6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
8) contained in or related to examination, operating or condition re-
ports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions; or
9) geological or geophysic information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (1977).
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closure de novo. Moreover, to reinforce the emphasis on access to in-
formation, the statute places on the agency the burden of justifying
nondisclosure.5
Exemption five of the FOIA, protecting from public disclosure
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency," " has the
greatest potential breadth of the Act's nine exemptions. 7 The source
of extensive litigation,8 the exemption evinces Congress's intention
to prevent the premature disclosure of agency records and to en-
courage the candid exchange of opinions by agency personnel. 9 To
identify this privileged information, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that common law discovery principles can provide guidance in
exemption five disputes.'0
Accordingly, in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Depart-
ment of the Air Force," the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit examined the role of the attorney-client and delibera-
tive process privileges in exemption five proceedings. On appeal from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,12 Mead
Data Central sought disclosure of seven documents involving a licens-
ing agreement between the Air Force and West Publishing Company.'
3
Finding that the trial judge had applied an impermissibly broad inter-
pretation of the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration under a narrower construction of exemption five.' 4
Mead Data Central represents the first appellate court application
of the attorney-client privilege to exemption five disputes. Although
it declined to sanction the breadth of the exemption sought by the Air
Force, the court in Mead Data Central nevertheless determined that
the privilege constitutes an "essential ingredient" of exemption five.' 5
5. Id. § 552(a) (3) (1977).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970).
7. See Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-
Agency Memoranda, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1047, 1048-50 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Memoranda Exemption].
8. See notes 21-48 infra & accompanying text.
9. Congress accepted the agencies' contention that "it would be impossible to
have any frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings
were to be subjected to public scrutiny." See generally S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1965).
10. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
11. 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
12. 402 F. Supp. 460 (D.D.C. 1975).
13. 566 F.2d at 248-49.
14. Id. at 248, 262-63.
15. Id. at 248.
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The decision thus provides considerable potential for defeating the
FOIA's objective of optimum public disclosure. This Comment will
examine Mead Data Central and consider the extent to which the
attorney-client privilege successfully may be asserted in exemption
five proceedings.
DEVELOPMENT OF EXEMPTION FIVE
Judicial Interpretations
Intending that principles of discovery be applied in resolving
exemption five claims, Congress authorized the disclosure of all
written information that could be discovered by a private party in
civil litigation with the government.', Consequently, the courts have
construed the exemption narrowly.
The rationale for exemption five, which is closely related to the con-
cept of governmental privilege,'7 derives from the Court of Claims'
opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States,' a
decision antedating the passage of the FOIA. In Kaiser Aluminum the
United States denied an aluminum company access to governmental
records of a proposed contract between the company and the govern-
ment.' 9 The court upheld the United States' assertion of executive
privilege, stating that governmental privilege derived from "the policy
of open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning
administrative action." 20 Later cases applied the broad policy objec-
tives articulated in Kaiser Aluminum to exemption five disputes.
Thus, in Ackerly v. Ley,2 1 decided one year after the FOIA's enact-
ment, the District of Columbia Circuit described the goal of exemption
five as "the free and uninhibited exchange and communication of
opinions, ideas and points of view-a process as essential to the wise
16. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (3) (1977); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1966) ; Memoranda Exemption, supra note 7, at 1050-51. See also S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
17. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has described the function of governmental privilege as "protect[ing] documents
containing advisory opinions and recommendations or reflecting deliberations
comprising the process by which government policy is formulated." Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
18. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
19. Id. at 942.
20. Id. at 946.
21. 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Ackerly was an action to require the Com-
missioner of Food and Drugs to disclose documents related to a proposal to bar
carbon tetrachloride from interstate commerce.
1977]
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functioning of a big government as it is to any organized human
effort." 22
Despite these sweeping assertions of the extent of the governmental
privilege of nondisclosure, the scope of exemption five subsequently
has been narrowed. In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,23 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that, although the provision was intended to
encourage the free exchange of opinions among government policy-
makers, it "[did] not authorize the agency to throw a protective
blanket over all information by casting it in the form of an internal
memorandum." 24 The court concluded that only materials expressing
opinions or formulating policies were exempt.25
In 1973, the Supreme Court considered the privilege of nondisclosure
embodied in exemption five in EPA v. Mink.20 In Mink members of
Congress brought suit to compel disclosure of documents concerning
scheduled underground nuclear tests. Reversing a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordering in camera in-
spection of the documents, 27 the Court emphasized that exemption five
disputes should be governed by the standards applicable to private
parties' discovery of documents in litigation with Government
agencies.28 Although it endorsed the use of the privilege of nondis-
22. Id. at 1341. Although the documents in Ackerly were privileged, the court
warned against the "inevitable temptation of a governmental litigant to give
[exemption five] an expansive interpretation." Id.
23. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). Bristol-Myers
had sought an order compelling the Federal Trade Commission to produce certain
documents relevant to a rule-making proceeding initiated by the Commission on
the basis of an extensive staff investigation, accumulated expertise, and available
studies and reports. 284 F. Supp. 745, 746 (D.D.C. 1968).
24. 424 F.2d at 939.
25. Id. The court observed that the exemption was not intended to permit con-
cealment of purely factual or scientific material. Id.
26. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
27. 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Finding that the in camera inspection
ordered by the court of appeals had been "unnecessarily rigid," 410 U.S. at 92,
the Court stated:
Plainly, in some situations, in camera inspection will be necessary and
appropriate. But it need not be automatic. An agency should be given
the opportunity, by means of detailed affidavits or oral testimony, to
establish to the satisfaction of the District Court that the documents
sought fall [within exemption five. If the agency] fails to meet its
burden without in camera inspection, the District Court may order
such inspection. But the agency may demonstrate, by surrounding
circumstances, that particular documents are purely advisory and
contain no separable, factual information.
Id. at 93.
28. Id. at 91. The Court recognized, however, that discovery rules apply to
exemption five proceedings only by "rough analogies" because of the difficulty of
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closure for documents detailing the deliberative processes of agency
policy-makers, the Court nevertheless required segregation and dis-
closure of "purely factual materials ... [that are] severable without
compromising the private remainder of the document." 29
The effects of Mink were two-fold: lower courts routinely began
to recognize the "deliberative process privilege," 30 and amendments
to the FOIA in 1974 expressly codified Mink's requirement that non-
exempt, factual material within an otherwise privileged document be
segregated and disclosed to the public.3 1 In that year, however, the
District of Columbia Circuit tempered the severability obligation in
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train.32 In Montrose the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) claimed that the deliberative process privi-
lege should enable it to withhold summaries of evidence, 33 documents
necessarily factual in nature. The court held that the segregability
requirement in Mink did not mandate disclosure of all purely factual
materials. 34 Because the summaries represented a judgmental evalua-
tion of the significance of the evidence, the court concluded that they
could be withheld from disclosure under exemption five. 5
Despite the apparent extension of the deliberative process privilege
in Montrose Chemical, the Supreme Court significantly limited the
determining whether the government should be regarded as "a prosecutor, a civil
plaintiff, or a defendant." Id. at 86.
29. Id. at 91.
30. See, e.g., Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th
Cir. 1975) (Air Force personnel statements communicated during confidential
safety investigation exempt) ; National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516
F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (recommendations by the Federal Reserve System's
staff members exempt); of., e.g., Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(IRS documents exempt only if they could not be discovered by a private party in
litigation); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973) (purely factual
information compiled by the EPA non-exempt).
31. The amended provision states: "Any reasonably segregable portion of a
record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the
portions which are exempt under this subsection." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (1977).
32. 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
33. Montrose Chemical Corp. had sought to obtain summaries of evidence com-
piled by the EPA during DDT registration proceedings. Id. at 65.
34. Id. at 68.
35. Although the court recognized that the summaries consisted largely of
compilations of fact, it nevertheless concluded:
The EPA assistants here were exercising their judgment as to -hat
record evidence would be important to the Administrator in making
his decision regarding the DDT registrations. Even if they cited
portions of the evidence verbatim, the assistants were making an
evaluation of the relative significance of the facts recited in the
1977]
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privilege one year later in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.30 Reasoning
that exemption five was intended to protect the decision-making
processes of governmental agencies, the Court held that only predeci-
sional deliberative memoranda are within the scope of the provision.3 7
Explanatory communications made after an agency's decision, there-
fore, were non-exempt.38 Generally, with the exception of Montrose
record; separating the pertinent from the impertinent is a judg-
mental process, sometimes of the highest order....
To probe the summaries of record evidence would be the same as
probing the decision-making process itself.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). Respondent sought disclosure from the General
Counsel of Advice and Appeals memoranda regarding unfair labor practices.
37. Id. at 151-52. In support of its decision, the Court noted that the lower
courts have distinguished consistently between predecisional and postdecisional
communications. Id. Moreover, commentators have argued that the deliberative
process privilege should be limited further by denying an exemption to pre-
decisional materials that aid in the formulation of any policy ultimately adopted
by the agency:
Providing the public with a means of scrutinizing agency actions and
procedures is the basic purpose of the FOIA; there is no reason to
sacrifice the benefits to be gained from disclosure in an instance where
releasing information would not violate the purposes of exemption
five. Since, by hypothesis, an agency will no longer be in the process
of making a decision, disclosing information concerning the basis for
an agency decision will not involve the premature disclosure of
ideas. And agency personnel are not likely to hesitate to exchange
ideas because those ideas may be disclosed to the public if adopted.
The satisfaction of having one's own recommendations accepted will
usually override any fears of public disclosure.
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REv.
971, 1077 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
38. After concluding that the deliberative process privilege protects only pre-
decisional materials, the Court discussed the relationship between the work-
product privilege and exemption five:
It is equally clear that Congress had the attorney's work-product
privilege specifically in mind when it adopted Exemption 5 and that
such a privilege had been recognized in the civil discovery context by
the prior case law. The Senate Report states that Exemption 5 "would
include the working papers of the agency attorney and documents
which would come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to
private parties," . . . and the case law clearly makes the attorney's
work product rule . . . applicable to Government attorneys in
litigation.
421 U.S. at 154 (quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)). Al-
though the court of appeals in Mead Data Central sought support from the
quoted passage for its extension of exemption five to encompass the attorney-
client privilege, the Supreme Court clearly considered only the work-product
privilege in Sears, Roebuck. See text accompanying notes 88-90 infra.
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Chemical, the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have limited the
scope of the privilege authorized by exemption five of the FOIA. These
restrictions thus complement the procedural barriers to an agency's
assertion of privilege under exemption five.
Procedural Prerequisites
The FOIA places on an agency the burden of justifying its failure
to disclose requested materials. 39 Prior to 1973, demands on agencies
to meet this burden were minimal: district courts relied primarily
on in camera inspections of the documents 40 or on briefs and oral
arguments by the parties.41 In Vaughn v. Rosen,42 however, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit established compre-
hensive procedural prerequisites to be met by an agency seeking to
invoke exemption five. Vaughn requires not only that the agency pro-
vide a "detailed justification" of its decision to withhold requested
documents 43 but also that the justification be cross-referenced to
specific portions of the document.44 Only by following these procedures
could the claimed exemption be subject to adversary testing.45
39. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1977).'
40. See, e.g., Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973);
Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F.
Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Benson v. General Servs.
Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
41. See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 F. Supp.
1146 (D.D.C. 1971); Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
42. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). In
Vaughn, a law professor brought suit to compel the Civil Service Commission to
disclose Bureau of Personnel Management reports. Reversing a summary judg-
ment for the Commission, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the insuffi-
ciency of the record rendered impossible a determination of the documents' pos-
sible exemption five status. Id. at 822. On remand, the court directed the Com-
mission to provide a more detailed justification of its claim of privilege. Id. at 828.
43. Id. at 826-27. The court of appeals warned that courts would "simply no
longer accept conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions . . . but will
require a relatively detailed analysis in manageable segments." Id. at 826.
44. Id. at 827-28. In support of its decision, the court cited EPA v. Mink. Id. at
824. For a discussion of Mink see notes 26-29 supra & accompanying text.
45. 484 F.2d at 824. The court authorized the designation of a special master
"to examine documents and evaluate an agency's contention of exemption . . .
[thereby] assist[ing] the adversary process by assuming much of the burden of
examining and evaluating voluminous documents that currently falls on the trial
judge." Id.
1977]
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Cuneo v. Schlesinger,46 also decided by the District of Columbia
Circuit in 1973, imposed additional requirements on an agency
claiming the exemption five privilege. Consistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in EPA v. Mink, the court emphasized that in camera
inspections of disputed materials would not be granted automatically.47
Moreover, a trial judge's agreement with an agency following an in
camera inspection did not release the latter from its obligation to
comply with Vaughn's procedural requirements.48 By imposing suc-
cessively heavier burdens on agencies seeking to withhold requested
information, the decisions in Vaughn and Cuneo further discouraged
the invocation of the privilege authorized by exemption five of the
FOIA.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PRELIMINARIES
The scope of the attorney-client privilege 49 was well-defined when
the court in Mead Data Central considered its application to exemption
five proceedings. Intended to encourage full disclosure by a client to
his attorney,50 the privilege is unavailable unless certain requirements
are met: the client must be seeking legal advice 51 from a legal advisor
46. 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
47. Id. at 1091-92. In camera inspection in FOIA disputes is beneficial primarily
because judges are able to insure that the public has access to the maximum
amount of material that lawfully can be disclosed. Nevertheless, for three reasons,
district court judges should avoid the routine use of such inspections. First, the
in camera process, necessarily non-adversarial, denies one party complete access
to relevant facts. Second, little precedential value attaches to an in camera inspec-
tion because the judge cannot provide a detailed explanation of his findings.
Third, a requirement to inspect a large number of documents without having
narrowed the issues previously by adversary proceedings taxes judicial resources.
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REV.
971, 1125 (1975) ; Note, In Camera Inspection under the Freedom of Information
Act, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 557, 559 (1974).
48. 484 F.2d at 1092.
49. The attorney-client privilege extends protection to the "confidential com-
munications between an attorney and his client relating to a legal matter for
which the client has sought professional advice." Mead Data Central, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (foot-
note omitted).
50. See generally Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1928).
51. See, e.g., Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Del. 1943);
In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). If an organization claims the
privilege, it encompasses only the information divulged by those employees having
authority to make decisions on the specific matter presented to the attorney. See,
e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D.
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functioning in a professional capacity; 52 the information divulged
must be confidential in nature,53 relate to the legal advice sought, 4
and originate with the client.5 The privilege, which exists regardless
of the initiation or completion of litigation,56 has been applied in the
federal courts to protect from disclosure advice from an attorney to
his client as well as information from a client to his attorney.57
MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC. V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE
Mead Data Central, Inc. initiated an FOIA request for Air Force
documents concerning the Department's Federal Legal Information
Through Electronics (FLITE) project.5 8 When the Office of the Judge
Advocate General advised Mead Data Central that eight of the docu-
ments would be withheld under exemption five,59 the company ap-
pealed to the Office of the Secretary, which affirmed on the ground
574 (E.D. Wash. 1975); Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Okla. 1967); Phila-
delphia Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1962). But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92
(7th Cir. 1970), affd per curian by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
52. See, e.g., NLRB v. Harvy, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965); Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963); State v. Smith, 138
N.C. 700, 50 S.E. 859 (1905) ; Benedict v. State, 44 Ohio 679, 11 N.E. 125 (1887).
53. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1963); United
States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958) ; Cafritz
v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1948); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
54. See. e.g., United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 952 (1976) ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975) ;
See, e.g., Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942);
Liggett v. Glenn, 51 F. 381 (8th Cir. 1892).
55. See, e.g., Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954);
Frank v. Morley's Estate, 106 Mich. 635, 64 N.W. 577 (1895).
56. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891) ; Jessup v.
Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P.2d 177 (1957).
57. See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1096 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) ; Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956) ; United States v. Osborn, 409 F.
Supp. 406, 409 (D. Ore. 1975) ; 8 in 1 Pet Prods., Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp.
253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
58. Project FLITE constituted a computerized system of legal research. See
Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,
248 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59. The Office of the Judge Advocate General asserted that the documents were
exempt from disclosure "as attorney work products or intra-agency memoranda."
Beyond divulging the author and recipient of some of the documents and the sub-
ject of each, however, the Air Force presented no explanation of their content.
See id. at 248 & n.3.
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that the materials were exempt under either the deliberative process
or the attorney-client privilege. The Air Force then released one of the
documents 6 0 but retained the remaining seven, all of which pertained
to the negotiation of a licensing agreement between the Air Force and
West Publishing Company.
Thereafter, Mead Data Central filed suit in the district court seek-
ing an injunction to compel disclosure,6 ' and the Air Force submitted
affidavits describing the contents of each document.6 2 Finding all of
60. The Air Force continued to assert that the disclosed information fell within
exemption five. Nevertheless, no governmental purpose would have been served
by withholding the document because its contents already had been revealed to a
senator and his constituent. Id. at 248 n.4.
61. Such suits are authorized under 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1977).
62. The court summarized the affidavits' description of the documents:
1. A legal opinion, addressed to the Patents Division of the Office
of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force and prepared by at-
torneys in the Litigation Division of the same Office, as to whether
copyrighted material which the Air Force converts to machine-
readable form would be subject to disclosure under the FOIA. It also
reflects an orally communicated opinion of a Justice Department at-
torney on the same matter and does not contain any factual material.
2. The request from the Patents Division which asked for the legal
opinion labeled document 1. It reflects the status of the negotiations
with West at the time of the request and asks for legal advice on how
best to facilitate the on-going negotiations. It does not represent a
final agency position in the negotiations.
3. An undated, unsigned memorandum prepared in the Patents
Division which sets forth for Air Force policy makers the offers and
counter-offers in the negotiations between West and the Air Force
regarding the licensing agreement to permit the Air Force to use
copyrighted materials belonging to West. It contains predecisional
information about ongoing negotiations.
4. A legal opinion prepared by the Patents Division setting forth
the background and negotiations with West and providing a legal
rationale as to why a license from West would be necessary. It con-
tains legal conclusions regarding the licensing agreement and recom-
mendations as to what course the negotiations should take.
5. A memorandum to the Chief of the Patents Division from the
Office of the Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Defense
commenting on the legal conclusions in the opinion labeled document
4. It also sets forth views on justifying to a congressional committee
the obtaining of a license for storage and retrieval of copyrighted
legal information. It does not contain any information other than
legal opinions and conclusions.
6. A handwritten, undated memorandum for the file prepared by a
member of the Patents Division regarding a meeting between repre-
sentatives of the Air Force and West to discuss prospects of the De-
partment obtaining a license to use West's copyrighted materials. It
reflects discussions among Air Force personnel regarding West's
[Vol. 19:343
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the materials to be within the fifth exemption,63 the district court
conducted an in camera inspection and also concluded that the docu-
ments contained no segregable portions that could be disclosed . 4 In
addition, the court determined that several of the documents were
within the attorney-client privilege because they had been "(1) pre-
pared by attorneys, (2) on behalf of a client who has invoked the
privilege, (3) for the purpose of presenting an opinion of law." 65
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the lower court's application of a broad interpretation of the exemp-
tion five deliberative process and attorney-client privileges. The
appellate court remanded the case for reconsideration under narrower
construction 66 and directed the Air Force to augment its claim that the
documents were non-segregable with a detailed justification of its
assertion67
The Deliberative Process Privilege Documents
The Air Force contended that the deliberative process privilege ap-
plied to four of the documents in dispute. Two of the documents con-
sisted largely of interpretations and recommendations by Department
personnel to be used in negotiations with West Publishing Company.6 8
The appellate court agreed that this material fell within exemption
negotiations and current offers. The discussions regard predecisional
views as to what positions the Air Force should consider in the
negotiations.
7. A handwritten, undated memorandum prepared by a member of
the Patents Division regarding a telephone conversation with another
Air Force employee on the staff of LITE [an early title for Project
FLITE] regarding the position of the LITE staff as to negotiations
with West for a license to use copyrighted materials in the LITE
data base. It reflects West's negotiations and current offers, and pre-
decisional views as to what positions the Air Force should consider in
the negotiations.
566 F.2d at 249-50.
63. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 402 F.
Supp. 460, 463 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd & remanded, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 464. The district court concluded that although the "[d]efendants'
grudging revelation at the administrative level of the subject matter of the
seven documents withheld hardly comports with the procedures outlined in
Vaughn v. Rosen ... and Cuneo v. Schlesinger," the affidavits adequately elabo-
rated the materials' content. Id. at 462 (citations omitted). For a discussion of
Vaughn and Cuneo see notes 42-48 supra & accompanying text.
65. 402 F. Supp. at 463.
66. 566 F.2d at 247, 254-55, 258, 262-63.
67. Id. at 247, 262-63.
68. For the descriptions of documents six and seven see note 62 supra.
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five's deliberative process privilege.0 9 The remaining two memoranda,
however, primarily contained factual materials pertaining to the nego-
tiations.70 For example, document three was a running summary of
offers and counter-offers between the Air Force and West.71 The
court of appeals criticized the lower court's rationale that this docu-
ment was exempt as a reflection of ongoing developments in the nego-
tiating process; this reasoning, it stated, constituted "an entirely
too broad reading of exemption five." 72 The appellate court also deter-
mined that, although the Air Force's internal self-evaluation of the
negotiations would fall within the deliberative process privilege, in-
formation regarding its negotiating process with an outside party,
such as West, would not.73 Withholding the latter information, the
court concluded, would not serve exemption five's objectives of avoid-
ing premature disclosure of agency decisions and encouraging the free
exchange of ideas among agency personnel. Because the Air Force
previously had divulged the offers to West, a party outside the De-
partment, the government would have no control over their subsequent
disclosure and therefore could not claim the deliberative process
privilege as to document three.74 In distinguishing between those docu-
ments containing opinions and recommendations of Air Force person-
nel and those materials presenting factual information relevant to the
69. 566 F.2d at 257. In response to Mead Data's argument that documents six
and seven were reportorial and factual rather than deliberative in nature, the
court stated:
It would exalt form over substance to exempt documents in which staff
recommend certain action or offer their opinions on given issues but
require disclosure of documents which only "report" what those recom-
mendations and opinions are. The evaluations, opinions, and recom-
mendations reported in documents 6 and 7 are the raw materials
which went into the decision of the Air Force to contract with West
Publishing Co. on certain terms.
Id.
70. For the descriptions of documents two and three see note 62 supra.
71. 566 F.2d at 257.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 257-58. The court cited Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II), 523 F.2d 1136,
1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975) for the proposition that "[p]redecisional materials are not
exempt merely because they are predecisional; they must also be a part of the
deliberative process within a government agency." 566 F.2d at 257.
74. Id. at 257-58. Although the court of appeals did not review specifically
whether the material contained in document two should be exempt from dis-
closure under the deliberative process privilege, insofar as that document con-
tained factual information reflecting the Air Force's negotiations with West, the
court's reasoning with respect to the third document should apply equally to the
second. Nevertheless, because document two was a request for legal advice, see
note 62 supra, the court recognized that the factual material it contained possibly
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discussions between the Air Force and a non-governmental entity,
Mead Data Central complements the earlier judicial interpretations
of exemption five. 5
Nevertheless, the court in Mead Data Central did not require that
the Air Force satisfy the precise nondisclosure procedural require-
ments of Vaughn v. Rosen.71 Although the Department had failed to
provide a detailed justification for its exemption five claim, the court
of appeals concluded that for two reasons this omission was insuffi-
cient cause for reversal. Mead Data had been able to present its posi-
tion to the district court because the Air Force had provided a suffi-
ciently detailed description of the documents in the form of affidavits
submitted after the district court proceedings had begun. 77 In addi-
tion, the instant case was distinguishable factually from the situation
in Vaughn: the Air Force withheld less than thirty pages of mate-
rials, but the exemptions claimed in Vaughn had covered "many
hundreds of pages." 71
Notwithstanding the Air Force's ultimate provision of a detailed
explanation of the documents, the court of appeals determined that the
requisite procedural justification of non-segregability had not been
made. Rather, the Department had stated merely that the documents
contained no factual portions that reasonably could be segregated.79
Rejecting the claim that non-segregability had been proved by the dis-
trict court's in camera inspection, ° the appellate court ordered the
could be exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege embraced in
exemption five. 566 F.2d at 255 n.32. The Air Force could not have applied the
attorney-client privilege to document two, however, unless the information it con-
tained was confidential. Id. See text accompanying notes 100-101 infra.
Because the Air Force could not invoke the deliberative process privilege to
withhold document three from public disclosure, on remand, the only alternative
argument available for the Department would be that the threat of publicly
disclosed negotiations ultimately would inhibit private parties from contracting
with the government and restrain the agency's efforts to function effectively. As
the court in Mead Data Central noted, however, arguments that FOIA-mandated
disclosure would impede the performance of an agency's other duties generally
have been unsuccessful. Id. at 258. See Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 484 (6th Cir.
1974).
75. See notes 21-38 supra & accompanying text.
76. See notes 42-45 supra & accompanying text.
77. 566 F.2d at 251-52. The district court had reached a similar conclusion. See
note 64 supra.
78. 566 F.2d at 251-52. The court stated that "[w]e do not excuse the Air
Force's failure to provide Mead Data with sufficient detail about the nature of the
withheld documents and its exemption claims at the administrative level, but for
the purposes of this case those inadequacies are irrelevant." Id. at 251.
79. Id. at 260.
80. Id. Although recognizing the benefits of in camera inspections, the court
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Air Force on remand to provide a more detailed justification for its
assertion of the documents' non-segregability.8'
Attorney-Client Privilege Documents
In Mead Data Central, the District of Columbia Circuit observed
that, because the policy objective of the attorney-client privilege is
consonant with that of exemption five of the FOIA, the quality of
decision-making protected by the exemption would be safeguarded
further by ensuring the confidentiality of an agency's communications
with its attorneys.8 2 The attorney-client privilege encourages complete
disclosure from client to attorney; similarly, exemption five encour-
ages the free flow of agency advice and opinions. The extension of
exemption five to encompass the attorney-client privilege therefore
would foster better advice and opinions.8 3
Although the court's reasoning is sound as a general principle, it
contradicts the FOIA's objective of promoting extensive public dis-
closure. The maintenance of confidentiality of factual information di-
vulged during consultation encourages a client to disclose all perti-
nent facts and thereby permits an attorney to furnish more effective
legal advice.8 4 Under exemption five's previous judicial construction,
however, all factual information forming the basis for the advice and
opinions of agency personnel is subject to the disclosure requirement
of the FOIA unless the facts themselves would expose the deliberative
process through which the opinions were derived.85
Acknowledging that an "overlap" exists between the attorney-client
and the deliberative process privileges, the court in Mead Data Central
nevertheless distinguished the two concepts:
concluded: "Nonetheless, in camera decisions ... are still essentially ex parte and
unaided by the benefits of adversarial proceedings which buttress the validity of
judicial decisions." Id. For a discussion of the propriety of in camera inspections
see note 47 supra.
81. 566 F.2d at 260-63.
82. Id. at 252. In response to Mead Data's argument that the privilege was in-
applicable because the communications in question had been exchanged between
attorneys, the court stated that "'[a]ttorney' and 'client' are not mutually ex-
clusive classes, . . . and simply because one is educated or even employed as a
lawyer should not debar him from seeking professional legal counsel with the
assurance that his communications will not be subject to disclosure without his
assent." Id. at 253 n.21. See also Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26,
37 (D. Md. 1974).
83. 566 F.2d at 252.
84. Thus, the court stated: "The opinion of even the finest attorney . . . is no
better than the information which his client provides." Id.
85. See notes 21-38 supra & accompanying text.
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[T]he attorney-client privilege permits nondisclosure of an
attorney's opinion or advice in order to protect the secrecy
of the underlying facts, while the deliberative process
privilege directly protects advice and opinions and does not
permit the nondisclosure of underlying facts unless they
would indirectly reveal the advice, opinions, and evaluations
circulated within the agency as part of its decision-making
process.8 6
Thus, by permitting an agency to shield factual information under an
attorney-client privilege, the court of appeals not only expressly disre-
garded its own mandate to construe FOIA exemptions narrowly so as
to insure maximum public disclosure8 7 but also undermined the dis-
tinction between the attorney-client and the deliberative process
privileges.
In adopting the attorney-client privilege, the court cited the Su-
preme Court's decision in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.s8 The privi-
lege discussed in Sears, Roebuck, however, protected an attorney's
work-product; the Court mentioned the attorney-client privilege only
as part of the legislative history supporting the work-product privi-
lege. 9 Narrower than the attorney-client privilege, the work-product
privilege applies to material prepared in contemplation of litigation.9 0
In addition, the court of appeals cited Izaak Walton League v.
AEC "I as an example of a federal district court's excusing legal ad-
vice from disclosure under exemption five.2 - The court in Izaak Wal-
ton, however, did not necessarily apply the attorney-client privilege;
rather, it held that legal opinions fell within the scope of the delibera-
tive process privilege, 93 a conclusion reiterated by the court in Mead
Data Central.94 Thus, the ultimate effect of Mead Data Central will
be to withhold from disclosure purely factual information that an
agency conveys to its legal counsel; the attorney's resulting advice
86. 566 F.2d at 254-55 n.28.
87. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-
Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469-71 (D.D.C. 1972).
88. 566 F.2d at 252-53.
89. For the text of the Court's work-product discussion in Sears, Roebuck see
note 38 supra.
90. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-13 (1947); NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154-55 (1975); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
91. 380 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
92. 566 F.2d at 253.
93. 380 F. Supp. at 637.
94. 566 F.2d at 254-55 & n.28.
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already will be exempt in most instances as deliberations reflecting the
policy-making process.
Without further justification for its conclusion that exemption
five encompassed the attorney-client privilege, the court of appeals
ascertained the status of the three documents for which the Air Force
had invoked the privilege. The court reversed the district court's
exemption of two of the documents 05 because the Air Force had
failed to establish that the materials met the confidentiality require-
ment of the attorney-client privilege.m Having failed to allege that the
memoranda contained confidential factual information, the Air Force
could not fulfill its burden of justifying an exemption to the FOIA
disclosure requirements and therefore could not invoke the attorney-
client privilege as to documents one and five.9 7
The court also reversed the lower court's exemption of document
four,9 1 the remaining document for which the attorney-client privi-
lege was invoked.9 9 The Air Force's description of document four
stated that its content related to background and negotiations with
West. Reasoning that the document could contain information re-
garding offers, counteroffers, or general background material, the
court concluded that document four could be non-confidential; such
factual information probably would be known by West or another out-
side party. 00 As Judge McGowan recognized in his dissent in Mead
Data Central, the majority's position that prior third party knowledge
defeats the element of confidentiality, and therefore the entire at-
torney-client privilege, emasculates the extent of the privilege inas-
much as most attorney-client discussions concern the client's associa-
tions with third parties.1 1 Nonetheless, in the context of the FOIA,
any limitation on an agency's ability to withhold purely factual mate-
rial from disclosure by invoking the attorney-client privilege is appro-
priate.
95. For the description of documents one and five see note 62 supra.
96. 566 F.2d at 254.'For a discussion of the prerequisites to a successful claim
of attorney-client privilege see notes 51-55 supra & accompanying text.
97. 566 F.2d 253-54. The court stated that disclosure must be made on remand
unless the Air Force could demonstrate either:
that the attorney-client privilege does apply to those documents be-
cause the information on which they are based was supplied by the
Air Force with the expectation of secrecy and was not known by or
disclosed to any third party, or that they fall within exemption five
for some other reason.
Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
98. For the description of document four see note 62 supra.
99. 566 F.2d at 255.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 264 (McGowan, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of the Air
Force the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
presented a well-reasoned analysis of the deliberative process privilege
as it applies to exemption five of the FOIA. Complementing earlier
judicial constructions of the privilege, the court exempted from dis-
closure those predecisional materials consisting of internal evaluations
and opinions of agency personnel, but required the segregation and
divulgence of all factual information concerning the extra-agency ne-
gotiating process between the Air Force and West.
'Despite its logical treatment of the deliberative process privilege,
the court in Mead Data Central unnecessarily expanded the scope of
exemption five to encompass the attorney-client privilege. Because
most of the legal opinions that would be exempted from disclosure
under this privilege also could be withheld pursuant to the deliberative
process privilege, the effect and purpose of the privilege will be to con-
ceal from the public purely factual information forming the basis for
legal advice. Thus, the assertion of an attorney-client privilege will
not advance exemption five's policy objectives of avoiding the pre-
mature disclosure of agency decisions and promoting the free ex-
change of ideas among governmental officials. To the contrary, the
exercise of the privilege may defeat the FOIA's objective of providing
maximum public access to governmental materials. For example, an
agency attempting to conceal facts from the public may assert the
privilege successfully as to materials it has presented to government
attorneys under the guise of seeking legal advice.
The court of appeals strictly limited the potential impact of the at-
torney-client privilege as to exemption five in determining that the
Air Force could not invoke the privilege to withhold from the public
documents based on information concerning the Department's negotia-
tions with West. Nevertheless, Mead Data Central establishes in-
adequate safeguards to prevent abuse of the privilege in situations
when it may be exercised validly. Unlike the work-product privilege,
the attorney-client privilege will not exempt from disclosure only in-
formation transmitted to an agency attorney in anticipation of litiga-
tion. Moreover, an agency withholding information only need allege
affirmatively that the pertinent material satisfies the basic require-
ments, such as confidentiality, of the attorney-client privilege, and a
district court normally will be required to conduct in camera inspec-
tions of disputed documents if it desires to review the veracity of the
agency's claim.
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